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# ITS objectives

### Make transportation safer, more efficient and reduce emissions








### C-ITS

V2V and V2I




Source: Austroads, 2010




### C-ITS

 Communication using DSRC. DSRC-based range-rating measurements can enable GNSS/DSRC cooperative positioning.





VANET (<u>Vehicular ad hoc network</u>)



Source: Internet

## Satellite positioning accuracy requirements

- Road level (few m) More accuracy is needed
   Lane-level (< 1m)</li>
- Where-in-lane level (sub-m)
- Current systems mainly use SPS (Standard Positioning Service).
- SPS gives 1-5 m accuracy not suitable for lane-level precision.
- Use of augmentation techniques, such as SBAS has the potential to offer the required accuracy.
- Most imported C-ITS uses SBAS technology.



# But: Is it only accuracy we are interested in!

#### 90s and early 2000s: Accuracy



- Positioning techniques
- DGPS, RTK
- Multipath mitigation



#### **Now: Availability**



- Multi-constellation: GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, Beidou
- Sensor Fusion
- Position + orientation

#### Future: Safety & Reliability

- Safety of Life applications
- Functional Safety and Integrity
- Protection from spoofing/jamming







# Ex: Curtin University Driverless Buss



# **Accuracy VS Integrity**




#### Alert to driver/user



Integrity

## Challenges


- Standards? need to be set based on performance requirements.
- Complete map of risks (e.g. collision types, faults, etc.)
   and vulnerabilities (system errors, interference, jamming spoofing, etc.)
   and identify their probabilities.
- Integration of sensors (GNSS is a main component but not alone)
- Cost
- Communications
- Application dependence.
- Technology.




### Ex: Vulnerabilities due to the work environment

#### **Urban environment:**

- Loss of lock
- Heavy multipath
- Non Line of Sight (NLOS)
- Frequent cycle-slips




Use 3D citymodels




- Multipath mitigation at the antenna
- 3D city-models ray-tracing algorithms
- SNR monitoring
- Non-Gaussian error models
- VANET CIM concept



### Characterisation of errors (ex: clock corrections)




# **GNSS** Positioning Methods



#### SBAS

- Improved positioning:
  - sub-m (DGPS L1, L1/L5)
  - deci-metre (PPP)
- Integrity monitoring: error bounds for PL


Vulnerabilities linked to hardware, software and data link with the satellites






# Integrity monitoring

- Advanced RAIM (ARAIM)
  - Fault Detection & Exclusion based on statistical hypothesis testing
  - PLs computation based on estimated impact of faults on position solution
- Determine Protection Levels (PLs) as safety bounds to positioning errors
  - Take into account risk of anomalies/faults
  - PLs must be smaller than the Alert Limits (ALs) to guarantee availability








### **ARAIM**

- For standalone vehicle
- Multi-sensor
- V2V and V2I.



Current position

Alert limit

requirement box



Predicted

position

Predicted future

time pose

Alert Limit Requirement

**AT** 

# Testing Ex.

- Kinematic test in Tokyo (with TUMSAT)
- Trimble RTK (10Hz)
- GPS, GLONASS and BeiDou
- a Bosch-consumer grade MEMS IMU
   The heading error of this IMU ranged from -2° to 5°, can accumulate to 10° after 30 min if left uncalibrated.
- Speed sensor:  $\sigma = 5$  cm/s
- GNSS-Doppler:  $\sigma = 10$  cm/s.
- Reference : PPK & POS/LV





# Testing: challenging environment













# Integrity prediction

- Identify critical locations on the map, at different times of the day
- Integrity unavailable: red points (PL>AL)










### Actual data: Flow chart of sensor fusion (RTK, IMU, odometer)



#### **Protection levels**

<u>RTK</u>

$$PL_{AT,i} = K_{fa_{,i}} \sigma_{\delta AT,i} + K_{md,i} \sigma_{AT,i} + \sqrt{(\cos\theta \, a_1^T \, S_i \times \, b_o)^2 + (\sin\theta \, a_2^T \, S_i \times \, b_o)^2}$$

$$PL_{CT,i} = K_{fa_{i}} \sigma_{\delta CT,i} + K_{md,i} \sigma_{CT,i} + \sqrt{(\sin \theta \, a_{1}^{T} \, S_{i} \times \, b_{o})^{2} + (\cos \theta \, a_{2}^{T} \, S_{i} \times \, b_{o})^{2}}$$

#### **IMU+odometre**

$$PL_{AT,i} = K_{md,i} \ \sigma_{AT,i} + \sqrt{(\cos\theta \ a_1^T S \begin{bmatrix} b_{\theta_{IMU}} \\ b_v \end{bmatrix})^2 + (\sin\theta \ a_2^T S \begin{bmatrix} b_{\theta_{IMU}} \\ b_v \end{bmatrix})^2}$$

biases



$$PL_{CT,i} = K_{md,i} \ \sigma_{CT,i} + \sqrt{(\sin\theta \ a_1^T S \begin{bmatrix} b_{\theta_{IMU}} \\ b_v \end{bmatrix})^2 + (\cos\theta \ a_2^T S \begin{bmatrix} b_{\theta_{IMU}} \\ b_v \end{bmatrix})^2}$$

### **Doppler**

$$PL_{AT,i} = K_{md,i} \ \sigma_{AT,i} + \left[ (\cos\theta \ a_1^T S \begin{bmatrix} b_{v_E} \\ b_{v_N} \end{bmatrix})^2 + (\sin\theta \ a_2^T S \begin{bmatrix} b_{v_E} \\ b_{v_N} \end{bmatrix})^2 \right]$$

$$PL_{CT,i} = K_{md,i} \ \sigma_{CT,i} + \sqrt{(\sin\theta \ a_1^T S \begin{bmatrix} b_{v_E} \\ b_{v_N} \end{bmatrix})^2 + (\cos\theta \ a_2^T S \begin{bmatrix} b_{v_E} \\ b_{v_N} \end{bmatrix})^2}$$

### **RTK Results**

G+R+B


G+R

\* 
$$\beta = 1 \times 10^{-4}$$





G



### All sensors


Combined

\* 
$$\beta = 1 \times 10^{-4}$$

**RTK** 

Doppler

IMU+odometer



## Summary

- ITS / C-ITS might be the norm in the near future.
- Real-time safety related applications in ITS/C-ITS require highly trustworthy positioning: i.e. integrity monitoring.
- The technology might not be the problem: cost and interoperability might be.
- Integrity Monitoring (IM) is challenging
- IM can be achieved, but which standards? Applications?



# Thank you



## Questions

